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PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRO-CHOICE 
ABORTION POLICIES IN THE NATION AND 
STATES: CHANGES AND STABILITY 
AFTER THE ROE and DOE DECISIONSt 
Eric M. Uslaner* 
Ronald E. Weber** 
"The Supreme Court," according to the legendary Mr. 
Dooley, "follows the election returns."1 In 1973, the Court's two 
landmark decisions, Roe v. Wade2 and Doe v. Bolton, 3 struck 
down statutes in the forty-six states where abortions were not 
permitted under any circumstances or were allowed only to save 
the life of the woman during the first three months of pregnancy. 
There had been a considerable increase in the level of support for 
the pro-choice position among the public in the few years preced-
ing Roe and Doe. But did the decisions themselves lead to even 
more public support for that position? What variations do we find 
among the states and where has the increase in public support for 
the pro-choice position seemed the most dramatic? Finally, what 
has been the impact of the abortion controversy on the political 
process? 
We shall examine these questions here and suggest some 
tentative answers. First, we shall consider the available national 
poll evidence. Second, we shall examine variations in political 
opinion on abortion policies in the states. Finally, we shall exam-
ine the abortion controversy as it has affected legislative decision 
making and electoral politics. When we consider the variations 
among the states, we shall present estimates of state public opin-
ion on abortion policy through a computer simulation technique, 
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University is gratefully appreciated. We are also grateful to John Mulligan of the 
Providence Journal and Bulletin. The Political Science Laboratory and Data Archive at 
Indiana University provided the necessary staff support for the data analysis. 
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1. Quoted in R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME CotmT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS at xiv 
(1970). 
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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developed by the second author and refined jointly by us, which 
permits us to get approximate figures on state opinions from na-
tional surveys. 
We cannot establish any causal relationship between in-
creasing support for the pro-choice position and the Court's 1973 
rulings. The level of public support was increasing in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. As we shall see below, it is not evident that 
a majority (or even a plurality) supported the pro-choice position 
by 1973. Even by early 1974, the margin of preference for that 
position was small enough to have resulted only from sampling 
error in the Gallup surveys. 
Vje would not expect a leveling-off of the increase in public 
support for the pro-choice position after the Roe and Doe deci-
sions, which altered "the law of the land." One of the critical 
characteristics of political leadership is the ability to elicit sup-
port from the public on controversial issues. Presidents have 
come to rely upon this "rallying around the flag" by the public 
almost as a requisite for making bold policy initiatives, particu-
larly on foreign policy.4 Once an initiative has been taken, public 
support increases dramatically. Presidents often reach their high-
est levels of popularity in the polls following such bold decisions, 
even if those decisions are later viewed as quite wrong.5 A bad 
idea becomes a good one once it has been ad.opted as national 
policy. The Cambodian incursion of 1970 provides one of the most 
striking examples of public response to presidential leadership. A 
Gallup poll taken shortly before the action showed only seven 
percent supporting such a move. After President Nixon ordered 
the incursion, the support level rose to fifty percent. 6 
We shall consider below the reasons why there has not been 
a similar increase in support for the pro-choice position. But we 
turn first to an examination of the national poll data. 
National Abortion Opinion Polls 
There is a vast amount of public opinion data on abortion 
policy. Unfortunately, few comparisons across these data sets can 
be made because of differences in question wording. Some ques-
tions are as direct as: Should abortions be legal during the first 
4. See J. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBuc· OPINIONS 53, 211 (1973). 
5. Id. 
6. See J. SPANIER & E. UsLANER, How AMERICAN FOREIGN PouCY Is MADE 94 (2d ed. 
1978). 
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three months of pregnancy? Others cite the Roe and Doe rulings 
of the Court. Still others concentrate on the conditions under 
which the respondent might support legal abortions. Yet another 
group involves the question of a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit abortions. Clearly, we cannot draw inferences across all 
of these questions. 
There is some consistency among sets of questions. Perhaps 
the most useful for overall comparison is a series of similar Harris 
questions asked from June 1972 to March 1979 and presented in 
Table 1 below. Before 1973, the surveys asked respondents 
whether they would favor legalized abortions during the first four 
months of a pregnancy; beginning in 1973, the questions men-
tioned the Court action and asked whether the respondent agreed 
or disagreed with the decisions permitting abortions during the 
first three months of pregnancy. Aside from the mention of the 
Court, the later questions were very similar to the earlier ones. 
We see in the table a drop in support for the pro-choice position 
in August 1972 and a sharp rise in support after Roe and Doe in 
April 1973. Comparing the April 1973 to the June 1972 responses, 
however, we find little evidence of a shift, and hence we cannot 
dismiss the possibility that the August survey had more error in 
it than the June survey. We see minor increments in support for 
the pro-choice position until August 1976, when the percentage 
favoring that alternative reached almost sixty percent and the 
size of the undecided group almost doubled. The August 1977 
survey almost completely restored the balance found in the April 
1976 poll. Finally, the most recent survey indicates that the pro-
choice position now has the strongest level of public support 
(sixty percent) that it has had since the Roe and Doe decisions. 
The Harris results thus suggest that there has been some incre-
mental rise in support for the pro-choice position, but that the 
Court decisions did not set off a steady increase in support for 
legalized abortions. Particularly in light of the 1973 change in 
question wording (specifically citing the Court's decisions), we 
would have expected a much larger increase in support for the 
pro-choice position if there were a process of legitimization at 
work; furthermore, we would also have expected a more 
continuous growth of support for that position. 
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TABLE 1 
TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON ABORTION LEGALIZATION, 1972-1979 
(Harris Polls) 
Favor Oppose Not Sure 
June 1972a 48% 43¼ 9% 
August 1972a 42 46 12 
April 1973b 52 41 7 
May 1975c 54 38 8 
April 1976c 54 39 7 
August 1976c 59 28 13 
August 1977c 53 40 7 
March 1979c 60 37 ,3 
Sources: DeBoer, The Polls: Abortion, 41 PUB. OPINION Q. 554 (1978); ABC 
News-Harris Survey, March 5, 1979.d 
nThe question was: Do you favor or oppose allowing legalized abortions to 
take place up to four months of pregnancy? 
bThe question was: The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that state laws 
which made it illegal for a woman to have an abortion up to three months of 
pregnancy were unconstitutional, and that the decision on whether a woman 
should have an abortion up to three months of pregnancy should be left to 
the woman and her doctor to decide. In general, do you favor or oppose the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision making abortions up to three months of 
pregnancy' legal? 
cSiightly different question: In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that ...• 
dWe wish to thank ABC-News, Washington, D.C., for making this release 
available to us. 
Further evidence on the possible impact of the Supreme 
Court decisions on public attitudes toward the legalization of 
abortion is provided in Table 2. In a series of annual national 
surveys conducted from 1972 to 1977, the National Opinion Re-
search Center (NORC), posed questions about the legalization of 
abortion in six hypothetical situations. The results indicate 
rather clearly that support for the legalization of abortion in each 
of the six circumstances increased between the spring of 1972 and 
the spring of 1973. In addition, the pattern of responses prevailing 
just after the Court decisions in Roe and Doe continued in the 
next four yearly surveys (1974 through 1977). After the Court 
decisions, almost half of the public supported the most liberal 
pro-choice option - legal abortion for a mother who wants no 
more children or a woman who is unmarried and does not wish 
to marry. Overall, the NORC series of questions suggests that the 
Court decisions had an impact on public opinion on abortion and 
that the public is very close to supporting legalization of abortion 
in the most liberal of circumstances. 
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TABLE 2 
TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON ABORTION, 1972-1977 
Reason for 
Abortion Response 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Defect in the Yes 74¼ 82'/4 83% 80'/< 82</< 83f/c, 
baby No 20 15 14 16 16 14 
DK 6 3 3 4 2 3 
Mother wants Yes 37 46 45 44 45 44 
no more children No 56 51 50 52 52 51 
DK 7 3 5 4 3 5 
Mother's health Yes 82 91 90 88 89 88 
threatened No 12 8 7 9 9 9 
DK 6 1 3 3 2 3 
Family is Yes 45 52 52 51 51 52 
very.poor No 47 45 43 44 45 45 
DK 8 3 5 5 4 3 
Pregnancy Yes 73 81 83 80 80 80 
result of rape No 19 16 13 16 16 16 
DK 8 3 4 4 4 4 
Mother wants Yes 40 47 48 46 48 47 
to remain single No 52 49 48 49 48 48 
DK 8 4 4 5 4 5 
Sources: National Opinion Research Center (NORC), General Social Survey 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977. This table compiles responsEs to 
the question: "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be 
possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if •.• , 1) 
there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby? 2) she is 
married and does not want any more children? 3) the woman's health 
is seriously endangered by the pregnancy? 4) the family has a very 
low income and cannot afford any more children? 5) she became 
pregnant as a result of rape? 6) she is not married and does not 
want to marry the man?" 
The Harris and NORC survey findings that the public be-
came more pro-choice in the wake of the Court decisions are 
generally reinforced by a set of Gallup (American Institute of 
Public Opinion) surveys asking virtually identical questions to 
the Harris questions from 1969 until 1974. The Gallup surveys, 
however, suggest that the movement of the public toward legaliz-
ing abortion was already under way just before the announcement 
of the Court decisions in Roe and Doe:The three Gallup surveys 
were taken in November 1969, December 1972,7 and March 1974. 
7. AIPO 861 was administered in early December 1972, and not in January 1973, as 
is often noted. 
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These Gallup polls showed a sharp increase in support for the pro-
choice position from 1969 to December 1972 (a month before the 
Roe and Doe decisions), and considerably less change from 1972 
to 1974. In 1969, 40% of the respondents favored legal abortions, 
compared to 50% opposed and 10% with no opinion. The respec-
tive figures for late 1972 were 46%-45%-9%. There was hardly a 
clear plurality favoring the pro-choice position; the 1 % margin 
could easily have been due to sampling error. However, there did 
seem to be a substantial increase in support for legal abortions 
across most major demographic variables. These data are pre-
sented in Table 3 below. In 1974, there was a barely noticeable 
shift of one percent toward the pro-choice position (46-47), with 
9% unsure. There were few dramatic changes in support levels 
from 1972 to 1974, despite the fact that the Court decisions had 
"legitimized" legal abortions during the first three months of 
pregnancy. 8 
TABLE 3 
TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON ABORTION LEGALIZATION, 1969-1974 
Percent Favoring Pro-Choice Position in Gallup Polls 
Change: Change: Change: 
11/69 12/72 3/74 1969-1972 1972-1974 1969-1974 
National 40 46 47 +6 +1 +7 
College 58 63 67 +5 +4 +9 
High School 37 44 44 +7 0 +7 
Grade School 31 30 25 -1 -5 -6 
Under 30 years 46 55 55 +9 0 +9 
30-49 years 39 48 44 +9 -4 +5 
50 and over 38 39 43 +1 +4 +5 
Protestants 40 45 48 +5 +3 +8 
Catholics 31 36 32 +5 -4 +1 
Men 40 49 51 +9 +2 +11 
Women 40 44 43 +4 -1 +3 
Sources: Gallup Opinion Index (February 1973 and April 1974) 
8. A preliminary analysis of the responses in the Center for Political Studies (Univer-
sity of Michigan) 1972 and 1976 national surveys to an identical question on the circum-
stances under which legalized abortions should be permitted reveals a pattern of no 
aggregate change in public attitudes on abortion before and after the Supreme Court 
decisions. In both 1972 and 1976, about 41 % preferred the pro-choice position under the 
circumstances posed in the survey. However, a cross-tabulation of the responses to the 
same question by members of a panel of individuals who were interviewed in both 1972 
and 1976 indicates that a substantial amount of change in opinion on abortion legalization 
occurred in the period that included the Court decision. A total of 40% of the panel 
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Examining Table 3 in some greater detail, we find that be-
tween 1969 and 197 4 there were marked increases in most demo-
graphic groups' support for abortion. The largest increase re-
ported in that table is for men (+11%), compared to a very mod-
est rise of 3% for women. Nine percent gains were registered for 
college-educated respondents and those under thirty, while Prot-
estants increased their support by 8%. There was a drop in sup-
port only among respondents who had finished only grade school, 
while Catholic support did not change much in the aggregate over 
the entire time span. When we consider the relative magnitudes 
of the changes over the six-year period, we find that the most 
dramatic shifts occurred from 1969 to 1972, before the Court deci-
sions. Only th~ age group of fifty and older and the college edu-
cated group registered gains of as much as 4% from 1972 to 1974; 
support among those with a grade school education dropped 5%, 
while that among the 30- to 49-year-olds, like that among Catho-
lics, dropped 4%. These changes are relatively modest compared 
to the shifts found between 1969 and 1972. All of the increase in 
support among high school graduates and those under thirty 
came in the earlier period. Of the ten demographic groups consid-
ered in Table 2, eight had larger shifts {up or down) in the earlier 
period than in the later years. Thus, it does seem that the Court's 
decisions "followed the election returns" - or at least the poll 
data. Indeed, an amicus curiae brief was filed by pro-choice forces 
in the Roe v. Wade case, and Justice Brennan specifically cited 
changing public opinion in his concurring opinion. 
The abortion issue did not play a major role in electoral 
politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, the Roe and Doe 
decisions took many politicians by surprise. In following public 
opinion, however, the Court could not have been oblivious to the 
rising level of public support for abortion among the traditionally 
middle-of-the-road groups in the electorate. This "silent major-
ity" (also called "the unpoor, the unblack, and the unyoung") 
became significantly more pro-choice in the early 1970s. Compar-
ing the Gallup poll results in Table 3 with other demographic 
breakdowns from Harris polls in June 1972 and February 1973, we 
note that the greatest increases in support for the pro-choice posi-
tion came from the following groups: younger voters (before the 
Court decisions); older voters (after the Court decisions); resi-
changed opinion on the proper circumstances under which legalized abortions should be 
permitted, with about half of the 40% moving in the pro-choice direction and the 
other half going in the pro-life direction. 
August 1979] Abortion and Public Opinion 1779 
dents of the Midwest and the South, and particularly residents 
of small towns; whites; middle-income workers; men; the college 
educated; Protestants and Jews; and Republican identifiers. Not 
all of these groups were part of any "silent majority"; nor were 
these groups the strongest supporters oflegalized abortions. What 
is important about them is that they had the greatest increases 
in support. The poor, the blacks, the independent voters, the city 
dwellers, the suburbanites, the affluent, and those residing on the 
two coasts already had strong majorities supporting the pro-
choice position and hence were not seriously affected by the 
Court's decisions. But the groups listed above were moving to-
ward a new center on abortion policy and the Court not only 
followed national opinion, it stepped out considerably in front of 
it. 
Two groups' opinions are particularly noteworthy: those of 
women and Catholics. The Gallup and Harris polls cited above 
indicate that men have been more supportive of abortion than 
women from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.9 On this issue, the 
women's movement does not reflect the views of most American 
women. Nevertheless, the gap between male and female support 
for at least some abortions seems to be narrowi~g. Women are 
now as likely as men to support abortions during the first trimes-
ter for many reasons that have been included in polls: when the 
life of the woman is endangered, when the pregnancy has been 
caused by rape or incest, when the woman might suffer physical 
damage from the pregnancy, when the woman's mental health is 
endangered, and when the woman cannot afford to support the 
child. Women are somewhat more supportive of abortion than 
men if there is a chance that the baby might be deformed. Yet 
most women maintain that life begins at conception and the dif-
ferences between male and female beliefs on that issue are both 
large (15-20%) and stable over time.10 
It is hardly surprising to note that Catholics have been less 
supportive of legalized abortions than most other demographic 
groups. The Gallup surveys summarized in Table 3 do show an 
increase in support for the pro-choice position between 1969 and 
1972 of a magnitude equal to that found for Protestants. After Roe 
9. See DeBoer, The Polls: Abortion, 41 PUB. OPINION Q. 553 (1978); Blake, The Abor-
tion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in ABORTION: NEW DIRECI'IONS FOR 
Poucv RESEARCH 51 (1977); Manier, Abortion and Public Policy in the U.S.: A Dialectical 
Examination of Expert Opinion, in ABORTION: NEW DIRECI'IONS FOR Poucv RESEARCH 1 
(1977); Gallup Opinion Index, July 1975, and April 1978. 
10. Blake, supra note 9, at 65. 
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and Doe, many Catholics reverted to their former opposition, no 
doubt reinforced by the strong stand taken by the Church on the 
Court decisions. The bulk of Catholic opposition seems to come, 
not surprisingly, from Catholic women, whose objections to abor-
tions have been strong and consistent.11 Catholic men have be-
come somewhat more pro-choice, but remain much less so than 
non-Catholic males. In 1974, white Catholic men were 12% less 
supportive of abortion whenever the parents do not want another 
child than white non-Catholic men. The gap between white Cath-
olic and non-Catholic women was about the same (13%), but the 
level of opposition among both groups of white women was higher 
than it was for white men. 
Judith Blake wonders whether what she calls a basically 
"conservative" public opinion on most aspects of abortion policy 
may undermine the legitimacy of the Court and of the pro-choice 
activists themselves.12 The Court misrepresented public opinion, 
she maintains, undermining the legitimacy of the decision and of 
any efforts by the bureaucracy to implement it. While Roe and 
Doe clearly followed the trend in the early 1970s, they went far 
beyond the actual level of public support for abortion. 
The abortion policies of Roe and Doe have not been legitim-
ized. We have not seen substantial increases in public support for 
abortion after the Court decisions; instead, we have witnessed a 
hardening of positions by many who were opposed to abortions. 
The issues have become increasingly salient rather than resolved. 
We have examined the patterns of support for and opposition 
to abortion within the national public, but we need to turn to 
variations across the fifty states. The states will be the major 
battlegrounds for abortion policy in the 1980s. 
Variations in Abortion Opinions Among the States 
To obtain a survey sample that would give results within 3% 
of the true population's opinions at least 95% of the time, we 
would need to interview approximately 1500 people. This would 
amount to interviewing 75,000 respondents to make generaliza-
tions about each of the fifty states. We must rule out such an 
approach on at least two grounds: (1) the cost would simply be 
prohibitive, and (2) even if we could gather the data, the number 
of cases obtained for the nation would be extremely difficult to 
11. Id. at 67. 
12. Id. at 80-81. 
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analyze (the computer time alone needed for analysis would be 
astronomical). It is important, nevertheless, to study abortion 
policies at the state level because that is where most decisions are 
made. We also want to study all fifty states, not just a subset. 
There do not appear to be any satisfactory criteria for selecting a 
"representative" sample of states. Virtually without fail, studies 
of selected states include the home state of the investigation -
it may be interesting, but it rarely is representative. 
In 1960, Pool, Abelson, and Popkin made the first attempt 
to estimate public opinion state by state from national surveys. 
Working under contract with the Democratic party, they dubbed 
themselves the "Simulmatics" project. 13 Their approach assumed 
that an individual's vote or attitude is basically determined by 
the social groups and political party with which that individual 
identifies. They created a set of 480 "voter-types," from which 
they constructed "synthetic electorates" for the states. Their 
approach assumed that the difference between Maine and New 
York is not truly a difference between inhabitants of the two 
states as such, but a difference in the proportions of different 
voter-types who make up each state. 14 Overall, the Simulmatics 
team had considerable success in predicting the putcome of the 
1960 election and was only somewhat less successful in the John-
son landslide four years later. 
These results led Weber and his associates to develop a more 
general computer simulation approach to estimate constituency 
opinion in the states.15 The National Center for Health Statistics 
of the Public Health Service simultaneously developed a similar 
model in 1968 to create synthetic state estimates of disability 
from data in the National Health Survey.16 Weber's model was 
similar to that of the Simulmatics project, although it used 960 
different voter-types.17 The initial simulations employed region-, 
occupation, size of place of residence, race, sex; age, and religion 
as the demographic determinants of the voter-types. A revision 
of the simulation methodology for the 1970s replaced sex and 
13. I. PooL, R. ABELSON, & S. PoPKIN, CANDIDATES, IssUES, AND STRATEGIES: A COM-
PUTER SIMULATION OF THE 1960 AND 1964 ELECTIONS (1965). 
14. Id. at 40-41. 
15. R. WEBER, PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCES IN THE STATES (1971); Weber, Hopkins, 
Mezey, & Munger, Computer Simulation of State Electorates, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 549 
(1972). 
16. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, SYNTHETIC STATE ESTIMATES OF 
DISABILITY (1968). 
17. R. WEBER, supra note 15; Weber, Hopkins, Mezey & Munger, supra note 15. 
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occupation with education and income as demographic variables. 
Both versions used a simple additive cross-tabulation approach 
with a "control" for region. The simulations were validated with 
state data on education (earlier work) and election results (both 
simulations). Overall, the various statistical criteria in the vali-
dation were well met; the earlier work accounted for slightly more 
than half of the variance in state-level voting returns, while the 
revised simulation accounted for approximately 70% of the varia-
tion in election results. 18 The same method is then used to esti-
mate public opinion within the states. 
The simulation methodology has met with fairly widespread 
acceptance and has been used in work other than our own. 19 Here, 
we report state estimates of public opinion on abortion policy for 
1969 and 1972 (see Table 4). The estimates are least reliable for 
Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, which have large 
Mormon populations. We cannot estimate the division of Mor-
mon opinions directly from the original survey data; hence, Mor-
mons are included along with all other Protestants in the estima-
tion of state-wide opinion. We have, however, refined estimates 
for the five states with large Mormon populations by making an 
assumption about the distribution of Mormon opinion on abor-
tion legalization and then adjusting the opinion estimates, de-
pending upon the size of the Mormon population in each state. 
We assumed that Mormons as a group are very strongly opposed 
to abortion. 
18. Montjoy, Weber, & Maggiotto, Estimating Constituency Opinion (unpublished 
mimeo). 
19. Hinckley, Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining 
Parameters of Subpresidential Voting, 64 AM. POLITICAL Set. REV. 836 (1970); Sutton, The 
States and the People: Measuring and Accounting for 'State Representativeness', 5 POLITY 
451 (1973); Rose, National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi• 
Level Policy Analysis, 67 AM. POLITICAL Ser. REv. 1162 (1973); Hopkins, Opinion Publics 
and Support for Public Policy in the American States, 18 AM. J. POLITICAL Ser. 167 (1974); 
Fry, An Examination of the Relationship Between Selected Electoral Characteristics and 
State Redistributive Efforts, 18 AM. J. POLITICAL Ser. 421 (1974); Sullivan & Minns, 
Ideological Distance Between Candidates: An Empirical Examination, 20 AM. J, POLITICAL 
Ser. 439 (1976); A. SCHNEIDER, OPINIONS AND POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES: THE ROLE 
OF POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS 3 (Sage Professional Papers in American Politics 1976); 
Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21 AM. J. POLITICAL Ser. 247 (1977); 
Kritzer, Political Correlates of the Behavior of Federal District Judges: A 'Best Case' 
Analysis, 40 J. PoL. 25 (1978); Erikson, Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behav-
ior: A Reexamination of the Miler Stokes Representation Data, 22 AM. J. POLITICAL Ser. 
511 (1978). Sutton & Wilson, Opinion-Policy Congruence: State Regimes and State Re-
gime Differences, 5 PoL. METHODOLOGY 127 (1978). 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATED POLICY PREFERENCES BY STATE ON ABORTION ON DEMAND IN FIRST 
THREE MONTHS OF PREGNANCY (1969 AND 1972) 
1969 1972 
No No 
Favor Oppose Opinion Favor Oppose Opinion 
State 'Ir 'lo 'lo 'Ir 'Ir % 
ALABAMA .247 .667 .085 .272 .633 .096 
ALASKA .532 .364 .103 .695 .261 .045 
ARIZONA .478 .396 .128 .600 .341 .060 
ARKANSAS .231 .677 .092 .250 .649 .102 
CALIFORNIA .533 .354 .114 .669 .277 .055 
COLORADO .516 .369 .116 .657 .286 .057 
CONNECTICUT .447 .441 .113 .489 .415 .096 
DELAWARE .449 .441 .110 .495 .402 .103 
FLORIDA .402 .484 .114 .349 .532 .119 
GEORGIA .252 .666 .081 .284 .622 .094 
HAWAII .508 .365 .127 .645 .306 .050 
IDAHO .406 .473 .122 .517 .416 .067 
ILLINOIS .398 .492 .110 .403 .514 .082 
INDIANA .390 .497 .113 .401 .507 .092 
IOWA .386 .500 .114 .395 .511 .093 
KANSAS .395 .493 .111 .408 .499 .093 
KENTUCKY .338 .530 .133 .280 .595 .124 
LOUISIANA .216 .693 .091 .237 .679 .084 
MAINE .442 .442 .116 .490 .404 .106 
MARYLAND .422 .477 .101 .388 .505 .108 
MASSACHUSETTS .433 .444 .113 .478 .425 .097 
MICHIGAN .380 .509 .112 .388 .526 .086 
MINNESOTA .384 .503 .113 .395 .517 .088 
MISSISSIPPI .223 .686 .091 .232 .669 .099 
MISSOURI .379 .502 .119 .375 .530 .094 
MONTANA .474 .402 .124 .602 .335 .064 
NEBRASKA .387 .500 .113 .396 .511 .093 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATED POLICY PREFERENCES BY STATE ON ABORTION ON DEMAND IN FIRST 
THREE MONTHS OF PREGNANCY (1969 AND 1972) 
1969 1972 
No No 
Favor Oppose Opinion Favor Oppose Opinion 
State '/,, '/c ¼ 'I< ~i 'lo 
NEVADA .494 .396 .111 .635 .312 .053 
NEW HAMPSHIRE .442 .445 .113 .494 .407 .099 
NEW JERSEY .472 .418 .109 .514 .392 .094 
NEW MEXICO .459 .407 .134 .583 .360 .057 
NEW YORK .525 .374 .102 .556 .349 .096 
NORTH CAROLINA .358 .514 .128 .302 .674 .124 
NORTH DAKOTA .347 .531 .122 .346 .560 .094 
OHIO .398 .491 .111 .408 .505 .086 
OKLAHOMA .399 .485 .115 .358 .523 .120 
OREGON .490 .388 .122 .617 .317 .066 
PENNSYLVANIA .459 .427 .114 .498 .401 .101 
RHODE ISLAND .414 .467 .120 .462 .466 .092 
SOUTH CAROLINA .350 .518 .133 .286 .690 .124 
SOUTH DAKOTA .353 .527 .120 .361 .561 .098 
TENNESSEE .365 .506 .129 .309 .567 .124 
TEXAS .393 .487 .120 .354 .634 .112 
UTAH .297 .592 .111 .391 .560 .069 
VERMONT .419 .465 .115 .466 .428 .106 
VIRGINIA .386 .496 .117 .343 .639 .118 
WASHINGTON .501 .381 .118 .638 .300 .062 
WEST VIRGINIA .423 .443 .135 .450 .432 .118 
WISCONSIN .373 .510 .117 .379 .634 .087 
WYOMING .477 .404 .118 .608 .330 .062 
Sources: AIPO 793 (November, 1969) and AIPO 861 (December, 1972). The 
question wording was: "Would you favor or oppose a law which 
would permit a woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any 
time during the first three months?" 
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As was true for the national public opinion data on abortion 
policy presented in Table 3, the state public opinion estimates in 
Table 4 indicate that support for abortion increased in most 
states between 1969 and 1972. In some states, particularly in the 
West and the Northeast, the increase was fairly dramatic. In 
other states, such as those in the Midwest and Deep South, very 
little movement occurred in either direction. Only in some of the 
Border South states was there any decline in support for abortion. 
Less than half the states showed plurality support for abortion in 
either year, but the number of states supporting abortion legali-
zation increased from 16 in 1969 to 22 in 1972. And no state that 
supported abortion in 1969 showed less support in 1972. 
Abortion Policy and Politics 
The Roe and Doe decisions did not produce a consensus sup-
porting the new "law of the land." Instead, they provoked more 
activity by both supporters and opponents of abortion. A consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting abortions has been proposed, 
but has not made much progress. The Roe and Doe decisions did 
force virtually all states to reconsider their abortion policies. With 
outright prohibition of abortions no longer a feasible alternative, 
the legislatures had to choose among a more limited range of 
options. The rather complex set of statutes that emerge from 
these restrictions has defied easy classification. We are still work-
ing on scaling procedures to reduce this complexity so that gener-
alizations can be made across the states. 
Once abortions could not be banned outright, the center of 
debate changed. Many abortions for poor women were funded by 
Medicare and Medicaid programs; abortion opponents sought to 
cut off such funding, and several states have taken steps in that 
direction. The fight to deny federal funds for abortions has occu-
pied a great deal of time in the last two Congresses, stalling 
appropriations bills for the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare for months. The pro-life groups lobbied strenuously 
on behalf of the efforts of Representatives Henry Hyde (R., Ill.) 
and Edward Beard (D., R.I.) to forbid federal funding of abor-
tions, and their message was clearly heard in the House of Repre-
sentatives. The Senate adop,ted a considerably more pro-choice 
position, and prolonged periods of stalemate led to a series of 
compromises that permit continued federal funding for many 
abortions. -
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What effect has lobbying had on legislative policy? No causal 
connection is discernible, but there are some indications that 
these groups have not been as effective as one would expect. 
Maris Vinovskis and his associates studied two proposals for 
abortion law reform and one bill about contraceptive information 
to develop an index of legislative voting on population policies for 
the lower house of Massachusetts. They found in analyzing roll 
calls for the 1970 and 1971 sessions that the legislator's religious 
affiliation and index of liberalism on other issues were the most 
important determinants of liberalism on population policies.20 
Richardson and Fox, in two studies of a Western Mountain state, 
report that the religion of legislators was the most powerful pre-
dictor of voting on abortion, dwarfing all of the demographic 
variables used as surrogates for constituency opinion and all other 
traits of the members; as one might expect, Mormons and Catho-
lics were the more pro-life, while Protestants and Jews tended to 
be pro-choice.21 At the national level, a study by Vinovskis indi-
cates that demographic features of the constituency display very 
weak relationships to legislators' voting on abortion policies in the 
House of Representatives.22 Instead, the members' general liber-
alism is the strongest, and their religion the second strongest, 
determinant.of House voting on abortion funding. Furthermore, 
a study by Congressional Quarterly indicates that members from 
heavily Catholic constituencies are not significantly more likely 
to vote against abortion funding than those from other consti-
tuencies; nor is there any strong concern for the political conse-
quences of voting one's conscience. 23 Our own conversations with 
observers both on and off Capitol Hill (including members) also 
suggest that the decision on abortion funding is an intensely per-
sonal one and is not easily altered by the lobbying of groups on 
either side. 
If the legislative process is not as susceptible to interest-
group pressure as we might have expected on such a volatile issue, 
20. Vinovskis, Jones, & New, Determinants of Legislative Voting Behavior on Popu-
lation Policy: An Analysis of the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1970 and 
1971, in POPULATION PouCYMAKING IN THE .AMERICAN STATES 239 (1974). 
21. Richardson & Fox, Religious Affiliation as a Predictor of Voting Behavior on 
Abortion Reform Legislation, 11 J. Ser. STIJD. RELIGION 347 (1972); Richardson & Fox, A 
Longitudinal Study of the Influence of Selected Variables on Legislators' Voting Behavior 
on Abortion Reform Legislation, 14 J. Scr. STIJD. RELIGION 159 (1975). 
22. Vinovskis, Interview on Abortion Politics, 1978, ZERO POPULATION GROWTH 
NATL. REP. (August, 1978) at 4-5. 
23. Abortion: How Members Voted in 1977, 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 258 (1978). 
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can these groups make their voices heard in elections? Pro-life 
groups have become increasingly active in electoral politics in 
recent years, endorsing some candidates and working for the de-
feat of others. Such groups have been given responsibility for the 
defeat of Senator Dick Clark (D., Iowa) by a relative political 
neophyte, Roger Jepsen, in 1978. Other defeats have occurred in 
primaries, most notably the bids of Representative Donald Fraser 
for the Democratic nomination for Senator in Minnesota and 
State Senator Minnette Doderer for the Democratic nomination 
for Lieutenant Governor in Iowa in 1978. All three candidates had 
been heavy favorites before the elections. There were claims of 
pro-life victories in other, less certain races as well. However, as 
with Environmental Action, which bienially selects the most vul-
nerable "Dirty Dozen" in the Congress as targets for defeat, it is 
difficult to determine how much contribution the pro-life groups 
make in any specific election.24 The fourth-place showing of the 
new Right-to-Life party in the state of New York, dislodging the 
Liberals from that position, was perhaps one of the most remark-
able achievements of the 1978 campaign: the party had not con-
tested state elections before and had only one candidate running 
in 1978, and the pro-life position had been embraced just as 
warmly by the third-place Conservative party. The new party's 
strength was not sufficient, however, to deny reelection to Gover-
nor Hugh Carey, a Catholic supporter of state funding for abor-
tions. 
One should not discount the effects that pro-choice groups 
might have had in recent ele'ctions, although they are not as well 
organized or as electorally active as the pro-life groups. It can 
hardly be denied that the pro-choice groups (both on their own 
and through other organizations in the women's movement) con-
siderably helped the successful reelection bids of Carey and Indi-
ana Senator Birch Bayh, the latter in 1974. 
In many respects the abortion controversy of the 1970s is 
similar to the busing disputes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Both the pro-life and anti-busing movements began in reaction 
to decisions of the Supreme Court. Both activated many people 
24. Representative James Cleveland, one of the "Dirty Dozen" in 1978, has filed a 
suit against Environmental Action, claiming that there are at least 100 members of Con-
gress with environmental voting records similar to his. The New Hampshire Republican 
charged that he was selected because he appeared to be electorally vulnerable (he won 
anyway) and that the environmental lobby could thus claim a "victory" ifhe lost, regard-
less of what might have contributed to the outcome. 
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who previously had been at the periphery of either electoral or 
group politics. The two movements each caught on quickly and 
developed a strong national base. And both groups aroused strong 
sentiments through the populist appeals of politicians. The anti-
busing movement rapidly waned in strength; today, it is virtually 
nonexistent. Is the pro-life movement ultimately headed in the 
same direction? 
It is difficult to give an answer to the question. For all of the 
similarities in the groups (including the probability of a high 
degree of overlapping support), some critical differences remain. 
While both groups have been successful in some electoral contests 
and neither has been particularly successful in ousting 
incumbents they have opposed, the anti-busing movement de-
pended much more heavily upon electoral politics than has the 
pro-life movement. In one sense, the political fortunes of the anti-
busing movement rose and fell with those of former Governor 
George C. Wallace of Alabama. Relatively few other Democrats 
followed Wallace's line on busing and many of the Republicans 
who did so lost office in the Watergate landslide of 1974. Busing 
was no longer a political issue after the paralysis of Wallace in 
1972 and the defeat of the anti-busing Republicans in 1974. The 
pro-life movement has become more active in electoral politics, 
but its real strength to date has been organizational. The anti-
busing movement had a dispersed constituency; if there was no 
busing in an area, or if busing had won general civic acceptance 
(as in Jacksonville and Seattle), there was no anti-busing move-
ment to speak of. The busing issue also proved to be of limited 
appeal as a long-standing concern. Eventually, even the citizens 
of Boston and Louisville realized that local politics and even 
school board politics were based upon more fundamental issues 
than busing. That "law of the land" might not be popular, but 
at least it is generally accepted. 
The pro-life movement, on the other hand, developed in com-
munities all across the country. The support of many religious 
denominations not only added to the legitimacy of the movement, 
but also provided critical organizational resources. Perhaps the 
linkage with religious denominations has been the reason why the 
pro-life movement, unlike the anti-busing crusade, has not been 
dominated by a single political leader or even a group of leaders. 
Neither Hyde nor Beard has become a national political figure. 
In fact, Beard's tactics in Congress almost got him into serious 
trouble with President Carter. Although Carter wanted to curb 
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government financing of abortions, he also wanted a Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare appropriations bill passed and chastised 
Beard for his narrow view. Beard's opponent used this episode 
quite effectively - even in a heavily Catholic and pro-life 
political district - and almost pulled off a major upset. The 
Congressman later apologized and promised to become a more 
"responsible" legislator.25 The example of Beard's close call with 
his own electorate may suggest that voters are reluctant to put 
single-issue candidates into office, even while the same voters 
organize into a multiplicity of such groups to promote policies. 
If this perspective is correct, it appears that the pro-life 
groups may face a most interesting paradox. The best chance of 
success for these groups is to work through organizations designed 
to affect policy formation, while the most dangerous course is 
through continued electoral action. The development of a: na-
tional Right-to-Life party might isolate the movement from its 
support in the Democratic and Republican parties and might 
encourage leaders to step forward as potential heirs to the Wal-
lace mantle of "new right" populism. But the paradox is that the 
pro-life groups have had only limited success in the policy-
making arena and have been most successful in some electoral 
situations. In order to have greater policy success, the movement 
might well deduce that it should step up its electoral activities 
to replace pro-choice legislators. Such a strategy would seem to 
have much potential for disrupting the bipartisan support the 
organizations have developed in Congress and many statehouses, 
and thus would probably ensure the pro-life movement a fate 
similar to that of the anti-busing movement. Whether the pro-life 
movement adopts that strategy may well determine the future 
relationship of the abortion issue to the more traditional eco-
nomic and social issues that divide the nation. 
25. Same Face, New Man Returning to Capitol, Providence Evening Bulletin, Nov. 
8, 1978. 
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